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CRIMINAL LAW-DURESS: NO DEFENSE TO
MURDER?-COMMONWEALTH V VASQUEZ, 971
N.E.2D 783 (MASS. 2012)
Duress has long been established at common law as a valid
affirmative defense to criminal conduct and has been recognized by
numerous states and the federal government.' The defense of duress
applies when an individual commits a criminal act under an imminent
threat that creates a reasonable fear of death or serious bodily harm to the
individual, who has no reasonable means of escape available, and where no
reasonable person could have acted otherwise.
In Commonwealth v.
Vasquez, 3 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC") considered as
a matter of first impression whether duress is a valid affirmative defense to
intentional murder. 4 The SIC held that while duress may be a factor to
consider for guilt reduction purposes, it is not an affirmative defense to
murder because the harm resulting from the defendant's crime is greater
than the harm threatened to the defendant himself.' This comment will
analyze the SJC's attempt to reconcile traditional common-law values with
recent criminal justice trends permitting duress as a defense to all crimes,
as well as the potential impact of the decision on future murder-underduress cases in Massachusetts.6
On November 3, 2001, Scott Davenport ("Davenport") drove his
car to meet a friend, Ismael Vasquez ("Ismael"), at the Alewife Subway

1

See Arp v. State, 12 So. 301, 303 (Ala. 1893) (defining duress defense at common law).

The Arp court held that duress was valid as a criminal defense where "the compulsion and
coercion operated upon the defendant, and forced him to the commission of the act,
notwithstanding he might have avoided the necessity by escape before that time." Id. at 304; Cal.
Penal Code § 26 (West 1999) (same); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 501.090 (West 2008) (same); Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 103-A (2006) (same); Respublica v. McCarty, 2 U.S. 86, 86-87 (1781)
(recognizing duress as valid criminal defense); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (1962) (advising that
duress is valid criminal defense); infra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing common law
history of duress).
2 See Commonwealthv. Robinson, 415 N.E.2d 805, 812 (Mass. 1981) (outlining elements of
duress defense); see also infra note 28 and accompanying text (same).
3 971 N.E.2d 783 (Mass. 2012).
4 Id. at 790 (stating issue before court).
5 Id. at 791-92. This particular logic underlying the defense of duress is known as, among
other names, the "choice of evils" rationale. See id. at 790-91; see also infra note 27 and
accompanying text (explaining choice-of-evils rationale behind duress defense).
6 See infra note 49 and accompanying text (analyzing SJC approach to issue of duress as
murder defense).
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Station in Cambridge. 7 Davenport had arranged to bring Ismael, along with
two other men and three women, including a woman named lo Nachtwey
("Nachtwey"), to Lawrence in exchange for heroin.8 Ismael had recently
formed a gang with these individuals and others who frequented the
Harvard Square area of Cambridge. 9 At the time of the incident, the gang
was experiencing internal tension, with Nachtwey's alliances to the gang
specifically in question.' 0 Davenport drove the group to Lawrence to
retrieve the heroin, after which the group returned to Cambridge and
stopped at a park." Once there, a male member of the group (Parker)
informed two of the women that when he signaled, they were to hold
Nachtwey down and Davenport was to stab her to death.12
After returning to the car, the group drove to a side street in
Cambridge near the Boston University Bridge. 13 Ismael handed Davenport
a ten-inch knife and told him, "You know what you have to do."' 4
Davenport told Ismael that he did not want to kill Nachtwey, to which

7 See Vasquez, 971 N.E.2d at 788 (describing arrangements made by Davenport and Ismael);
see also Brief and Appendix of Appellant Scott Davenport at 3, Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 971
N.E.2d 783 (Mass. 2012) (No. 10140), 2010 WL 8471747, at *34 (noting group met at Alewife
station).
8 Vasquez, 971 N.E.2d at 788. The other occupants of the car were Ana White ("White"),

Lauren Alleyne ("Alleyne"), and the two co-defendants, Luis Vasquez ("Vasquez") and Harold
Parker ("Parker"). Id. Both White and Alleyne testified at trial against the four men, pursuant to
a cooperation agreement. Id. at 787.
9 Id. at 788. This section of Harvard Square is also known as "The Pit." Id. In October
2001, Ismael and Parker announced plans to form a new "Crips set" in Harvard Square and
formally inducted its members in a Halloween ceremony. Id. The gang's primary objective
consisted of performing "missions" during which gang members robbed unsuspecting victims.
Id. The SJC did not consider Davenport to be a member of the gang, instead labeling him a
"nonmember associate." Id. at 787.
10 See id.at 789. Other members of the gang, a sub-group led by Nachtwey's boyfriend,
Gene Bamford ("Bamford"), were in revolt against Ismael's leadership and planned to rescue
Nachtwey by force. Id.at 788.
11 See id.at 789. The reason for the trip is a matter of some dispute the SJC's opinion
asserts that the group went to Lawrence solely to pick up the drugs, while Davenport's brief cites
Ismael's goal of acquiring a cache of weapons. Compare id.at 788 ("The group drove to
Lawrence. While the four men went to get heroin.., the [women] waited .... "),with Brief
and Appendix of Appellant Scott Davenport, supra note 7, at 7 ("[Ismael] wanted to go to
Lawrence to get weapons."). During the return trip from Lawrence, Nachtwey attempted to
escape from the vehicle, but Ismael the others to prevent her from doing so and White complied.
Vasquez, 971 N.E.2d at 789.
12 Id. The trial court found no evidence that Davenport was aware of a murder plot against
Nachtwey when he picked up the group. Id.at 787 n.3. Davenport's lack of knowledge of the
murder plot is further demonstrated by the fact that the jury declined to convict Davenport of
premeditated murder. See id.at 787 n.3 (listing defendants' convictions).
13 Vasquez, 971 N.E.2d at 789.
14 Id. (describing events preceding crime).
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Ismael responded, "You're not getting out of here if you don't."' 5 As the
group walked along a set of nearby train tracks, Ismael gave the signal and
16
the women pushed Nachtwey to the ground and restrained her.
Davenport ran toward them, shouting, "die, die, bitch, die," and repeatedly
stabbed Nachtwey, who unsuccessfully tried to fight back. 17 After she
stopped moving, Davenport and Vasquez threw her lifeless body into the
Charles River.' 8 At this time, Davenport ran his hands through his hair and
exclaimed, "What a rush!" as the group returned to the car and drove off.' 9
At trial in Superior Court, Davenport claimed that he had acted
under duress, an available defense to murder in Massachusetts, and
requested a jury instruction to that effect.20
Judge Brady denied
Davenport's request, instructing the jury that duress was not a valid

affirmative defense to murder)z '

The court stated the common-law

principle that "duress does not . ..excuse the intentional murder of an
innocent person.
Davenport was convicted of murder in the first
degree2 3 Upon the SJC's plenary review, Davenport argued that the trial
judge's jury instruction was in error.2 4 Further, Davenport claimed he was
entitled not only to an instruction that duress was a valid defense to murder,

but also that it may mitigate a charge of murder to a charge of
manslaughter.2 5 The SJC heard the case to determine whether a murder
defendant may argue duress as a valid affirmative defense in

15 Id. The SJC included these two statements as evidence of both Davenport's verbal

expression of his unwillingness to kill Nachtwey and Ismael's verbal threats of hanm to
Davenport. Id. Davenport's brief details a longer conversation which includes further statements
exhibiting Davenport's resistance and Ismael's coercion. Brief and Appendix of Appellant Scott
Davenport, supra note 7, at 5. In his brief, Davenport alleges that he said, "I don't want to, I
don't want to, I don't want to be involved in this. I don't want to do this," to which Ismael
replied, "You're going to do it and if you don't you won't walk out of here." Id.
16 Vasquez, 971 N.E.2d at 789 (detailing events preceding crime charged).
17 Id. Davenport's own brief concedes he said as much. Brief and Appendix of Appellant
Scott Davenport, supra note 7,at 6.
18 Vasquez, 971 N.E.2d at 789 (detailing body disposal).
19 Id. Davenport was not the only member of the group reveling in the crime; Alleyne and
White sang on their way back to the car. Id.
20 See id at 790 (describing Davenport's requested jury instructions). Davenport was jointly
tried with Vasquez, Ismael, and Parker. Id. at 787.
21 See id. at 790 (discussing trial court's rejection of defendant's duress defense).
22 Id. (quoting trial judge).
23 See Vasquez, 971 N.E.2d at 787. All four defendants were convicted of first-degree
murder. Id. Davenport was convicted of murder committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty,
while Vasquez, Ismael and Parker were convicted of premeditated murder, among other charges.
Id.at 787 n.3.
24 Id.at 790 (outlining defendant's argument).
25 See id.
(numerating defendant's objections on appeal).
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Massachusetts. 26
The affirmative

criminal defense of duress, also known as

compulsion or coercion, has a lengthy common-law history rooted in the
moralistic "choice of evils" rationale: duress is acceptable as a defense

when the resulting harm is less than the threatened harm.27

An actor

commits a crime under duress when faced with a present, immediate, and
impending threat that would induce "a well-founded fear of death or of

serious bodily injury if the criminal act is not done; the actor must have
been so positioned as to have had no reasonable chance of escape . ..
where neither he nor a person of reasonable firmness could have acted
otherwise in the circumstances. 2 8

26
27

The defense of duress is generally not

See id. (stating issue before court).
See United States v. LaFleur, 971 F.2d 200, 205 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining rationale

underlying choice of evils); see also 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT JR.,
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.3 (2d ed. 1986) (same). LaFave and Scott's original work, a
seminal treatise in the area of criminal defense, contained an oft-quoted explanation for the
reasoning behind the choice-of-evils approach:
The rationale of the defense [of duress] is not that the defendant, faced with
the unnerving threat of hanm unless he does an act which violates the literal
language of the criminal law, somehow loses his mental capacity to commit
the crime in question. Nor is it that the defendant has not engaged in a
voluntary act. Rather it is that, even though he has done the act the crime
requires and has the mental state which the crime requires, his conduct
which violates the literal language of the criminal law is justified because he
has thereby avoided a harm of greater magnitude.
LaFleur, 971 F.2d at 205 (quoting 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, § 5.3); see also United States v. Bailey,
444 U.S. 394, 409-10 (1980) (discussing LaFave's choice-of-evils rationale); United States v.
Mitchell, 725 F.2d 832, 835 n.4 (2d Cir. 1983) (explaining logic behind choice-of-evils rationale);
Vasquez, 971 N.E.2d at 790 (quoting LaFave's analysis of duress defense in reasoning). The
moral impetus underlying such a rule stems from the idea that "a person under duress ought to
choose 'rather to die himself than escape by the murder of an innocent."' Mitchell, 725 F.2d at
835 n.4 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *30); see also Alp v. State, 12 So.
301, 303 (Ala. 1893) (applying choice of evils to murder-under-duress case). The choice-of-evils
rationale is also known as the "balance of hams" or "lesser hann" theory. See Steven J. Mulroy,
The Duress Defense's Uncharted Terrain: Applying it to Murder, Felony Murder, and the
Mentally Retarded Defendant, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 159, 166-69 (2006) (analyzing balance-ofhams theory of duress).
28 Commonwealth v. Robinson, 415 N.E.2d 805, 812 (Mass. 1981). In Robinson, the SJC
clearly defined duress as a valid criminal defense in Massachusetts. See id In doing so, the SJC
held that a valid defense of duress meant the defendant was not capable of forming the proper
criminal intent. See id. The defense of duress is unique in that its ambiguous qualities have left
ample room throughout history for debate concerning its most basic definition. See Joshua
Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching for its Proper
Limits, 62 S.CAL.L. REV. 1331, 1349-50 (1989) (outlining disagreement over duress as excuse
or justification defense). American common law has historically distinguished between duress, a
defense to an act performed in response to a man-made threat, and necessity, a defense to an act
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available to an individual who recklessly puts himself in a position where
he is likely to experience coercion, for duress is rooted in reasonableness,
and recklessness is not reasonable.2 9
Anglo-American common law has consistently rejected the

acceptance of duress as a valid murder defense.3 0

Most state appellate

courts to address the issue have affirmed the common-law interpretation

regarding the unavailability of duress as a defense in murder trials. 3' The
Model Penal Code ("MPC") recognizes and advises duress as a defense to
all crimes, including murder.32 Some states' criminal statutes contain
language mirroring the Model Penal Code's liberal definition of duress and

permit its application to guilt reduction statutes.33 Most states, however,
performed in response to a natural threat. See id.at 1347-48. The Supreme Court has recognized
this historical common-law distinction between duress and necessity, but has also noted that the
line between the two defenses is unclear. See Bailey, 444 U.S. at 409-10 (discussing evolving
definition of duress at common law). Further muddling the issue, the Model Penal Code
distinguishes between duress and "choice of evils," characterizing them as two separate defenses.
Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (1962) (defining duress defense), with MODEL PENAL
CODE § 3.02 (1962) (defining choice-of-evils defense). LaFave appears to classify duress as a
justification for a crime, not an excuse. See 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, § 5.4 (arguing crime not
excused but justified by duress). Massachusetts follows the same model. See Robinson, 415
N.E.2d at 812 (same).
29 See United States v. Agard, 605 F.2d 665, 667 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding duress not "valid
legal excuse" for recklessness); Commonwealth v. Allen, 717 N.E.2d 657, 660 (Mass. 1999)
(denying use of duress defense due to defendant's reckless behavior); Robinson, 415 N.E.2d at
812 nil (noting unavailability of duress defense for recklessness under common and statutory
law); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(2) (1962) (excluding reckless and negligent behavior
from duress defense). Judicial and legislative efforts to keep the duress defense from reckless
actors underscores the inherent focus on objective reasonability present in any duress analysis.
See Robinson, 415 N.E.2d at 812 (discussing duress defense's standard of reasonableness).
30 See LaFleur, 971 F.2d at 205 (discussing common-law rejection of duress as murder
defense). The Anglo-American tradition of barring duress as a defense to murder is considered in
many legal circles to be "virtually unassailable." Alan Reed, Duress and Provocationas Excuses
to Murder: Salutary Lessons from Recent Anglo-American Jurisprudence, 6 J. TRANSNAT'L L. &
POL'Y 51, 58-61 (1996) (analyzing English and American common-law bar on duress defense for
murder).
31 See Arp, 12 So. at 304 (excluding duress as defense to murder); Brewer v. State, 78 S.W.
773, 776 (Ark. 1904) (same); People v. Anderson, 50 P.3d 368, 371 (Cal. 2002) (same); Wright v.
State, 402 So. 2d 493, 497 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (same); see also Mulroy, supra note 27, at
172 (discussing appellate authority barring duress as murder defense). But see Reed, supra note
30, at 60-61 (discussing recent appellate authority permitting duress as murder defense).
32 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (1962) (advising duress as defense to murder). The
American Law Institute drafters of the Model Penal Code rejected the expansive choice-of-evils
rationale, deeming it "hypocritical" to impose such a strict ban on the duress defense in all
instances of homicide. Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, Law in the Heart of Darkness: Atrocity &
Duress, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 861, 874 (2003) (discussing MPC drafters' intent and reasoning); see
also LAFAvE, supra note 27 (noting availability of duress defense to all crimes under MPC).
33 See ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.440 (1978) (applying MPC definition of duress as defense
to
murder); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 431 (West 1972) (same); HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-231 (1979)
(same); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-9 (West 1978) (same); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.00 (McKinney
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have adopted the common-law rule excluding duress as an affirmative
defense to murder as well as for purposes of guilt reduction.3 4
In recent years, an increasing number of courts and legal scholars
have argued for the allowance of duress as a defense to a broader range of
crimes, including murder.35 Judicial flexibility in the consideration of
duress for guilt reduction purposes in murder cases has also been on the
rise.3 6 Massachusetts courts had not addressed this issue directly, although
the Commonwealth's capital review statute provides the SIC with the
authority to consider duress as a factor in mitigating a murder charge to
manslaughter.3 7 Still, some courts continue to adhere to the common-law
rule of keeping the duress defense out of murder trials all together, citing
policy concerns that allowing it would encourage criminal gang members
to follow an order to kill if they knew they could avoid responsibility by
proving coercion.38 Courts have also applied this rationale in denying a
1968) (same); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-10 (1973) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-504
(West 1989) (same); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.05 (West 1973) (same); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-2-302 (West 1973) (same).
34 See Anderson, 50 P.3d at 377 ("The cases that have considered the question ..
have
generally rejected the argument that duress can reduce murder to manslaughter."); see also
Mulroy, supra note 27, at 172-73 (discussing state statutory and common-law authority barring
duress as murder defense); Reed, supra note 30, at 60 ("[Tlhe majority of American jurisdictions
still apply the common law, which is predicated on... an intolerance for the defense of duress
in cases involving any form of homicide....").
35 See Anderson, 50 P.3d at 387 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (noting
recent push for more flexible duress approach); Tully v. State, 730 P.2d 1206, 1210 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1986) (permitting duress defense in felony-murder trial). In rejecting Anderson's absolute
bar on the defense of duress in murder trials, Justice Kennard of the Supreme Court of California
voiced concerns in his dissenting opinion that the majority "oversimplifie[d] a highly complex
issue." Anderson, 50 P.3d at 387; see also Mulroy, supra note 27, at 207 (detailing modem trend
toward allowing duress defense for all crimes). While duress is still widely unavailable as a
defense to murder at common law, the fact that some states have adopted the Model Penal Code's
broader definition of the defense sets America apart from other common law nations. Mulroy,
supra note 27, at 173 (noting relatively liberal American approach to duress as murder defense).
36

See Anderson, 50 P.3d at 377 ("'While moral considerations require the rejection of any

claim of excuse, they do not require that the mitigation of the circumstances be overlooked."'
(quoting R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 1058 (3d ed. 1982))); Mulroy, supra note 27,
at 173 (observing modem flexibility in applying duress for mitigation purposes). LaFave even
argues that the presence of duress may necessitate a murder defendant's guilt reduction.
Anderson, 50 P.3d at 377 (quoting 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 27, at 719) ("[lit is arguable
that [a defendant's] crime should be manslaughter rather than murder, on the theory that the
pressure upon him, although not enough to justify his act, should serve at least to mitigate it to
something less than murder."). Such support for judicial consideration of coercive factors in
mitigation reflects the idea that duress may serve to justify, while not excusing, the commission
of a crime. See Dressler, supra note 28, at 1349-57 (analyzing duress as justification defense).
37 See MASS.GEN. LAWS ch.278, § 33E (2010) (outlining SJC's authority to review capital
cases).
38 See Anderson, 50 P.3d at 374 (citing negative consequences of allowing duress defense for
crimes involving gang violence). See generally State v. Scott, 827 P.2d 733, 739-41 (Kan. 1992)
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criminal defendant's use of duress for guilt reduction purposes.3
In Commonwealth v. Vasquez, the SIC addressed the issue of
duress as an affirmative defense to intentional murder.40 The SIC, relying
primarily on the choice-of-evils rationale, held that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury that duress was a valid
defense to intentional murder.4 '
In doing so, the SIC affirmed the
common-law rule, persuaded by the argument that the threat of harm to
oneself does not excuse the taking of an innocent life. 42 By killing
Nachtwey, the SIC reasoned, Davenport had not prevented the commission

of a crime of greater magnitude; therefore, duress should not have been
available to him as an affirmative defense .4 Additionally, the SIC cited
Anderson's policy considerations for keeping the defense of duress away
from defendants charged with murder.44 The potential for the availability
of the defense to act as additional motivation for a gang member to kill was

a concern for the SIC, as it was for the Anderson court.45

(affirming trial court's refusal to provide instruction regarding duress defense during trial of gang
member). In Anderson, the Supreme Court of California gave this policy argument a great deal of
weight, explaining, "California today is tormented by gang violence." 50 P.3d at 374. The
Anderson court did not address the uniquely pervasive nature of California's problems with gang
violence.
39 See Anderson, 50 P.3d at 377 (prohibiting duress as factor in guilt reduction); see also
United States v. LaFleur, 971 F.2d 200, 206 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding same rationale bars duress
as defense and for mitigation); State v. Nargashian, 58 A. 953, 955 (R.I. 1904) (reasoning duress
barred for guilt reduction due to presence of malicious intent). But see Wentworth v. State, 349
A.2d 421, 427-28 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975) (recognizing that duress may apply for guilt
reduction in certain cases). The Anderson court's reluctance to recognize duress as a mitigating
factor in murder cases also grew from concerns that doing so would in effect create a new
category of manslaughter, a job generally left to the legislature. 50 P.3d at 378-79.
40 971 N.E.2d 783, 792 (Mass. 2012) (holding duress not valid defense to murder).
41 See id. (applying choice-of evils-reasoning). In his opinion, Justice Spina quoted LaFave's
moralistic analysis in keeping the duress defense from individuals charged with homicide. Id. at
790. Specifically, the SJC rejected "duress as a defense to deliberately premeditated murder,
murder committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty, and murder in the second degree .... " Id. at
792.

See id. Echoing Blackstone, the SJC declared: "We are persuaded that, under our
common law, a defendant is not excused from taking the life of an innocent person because of the
threat of harm to himself." Id.; see also United States v. Mitchell, 725 F.2d 832, 835 n.4 (2d Cir.
1983) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 30) (explaining common-law
rejection of duress as murder defense).
43 See Vasquez, 971 N.E.2d at 792 (rationalizing complete bar on duress defense for murder).
The SJC did not consider any theory of rationale for the defense of duress other than the choice of
evils.
44 See id. at 790-91 (citing People v. Anderson, 50 P.3d 367, 374 (Cal. 2002)) (citing
California gang violence in reasoning). While echoing the Anderson court's concerns, the SJC's
opinion did not include a discussion of current gang violence trends in Massachusetts.
45 See Vasquez, 971 N.E.2d at 790-91 (barring defense in effort to deter gang violence). In
addition to the specifics of gang violence in the Commonwealth, the SJC's opinion did not
42
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While the SJC rejected duress as an affirmative duress to murder, it
did reserve the right to consider duress as a mitigating factor in guilt
reduction under the Massachusetts capital review statute.46 In conducting a
plenary review of Davenport's conviction, the SJC applied the elements of
the duress defense to the facts and found that no reduction in guilt was
necessary.47 The SJC, in barring duress as a complete defense to murder
while allowing its consideration for guilt reduction purposes in
"exceptional and rare circumstances," reasoned this slight alteration of the
common-law rule represented the fairest interpretation of the duress
defense as it applies to murder defendants. 48
In Commonwealth v. Vasquez, the SJC, by refusing to allow the
defense of duress to murder, chose to endorse an impractical and outdated
common-law principle. 49 The logic behind the choice-of-evils rationale,
that a person "ought rather to die himself, than escape by the murder of an
innocent," is based on a noble yet rigid moral sensibility that stretches back
almost as far as the common law itself.50 While such an estimable history

analyze the comparative nature of gang violence in Massachusetts and California.
46 See id.
at 792. The manner in which the SJC chose to announce this departure from the
common-law rule juxtaposes two competing views of duress as applied to homicide: 'Ja]lthough
we hereby reject duress as a defense to deliberately premeditated murder, murder committed with
extreme atrocity or cruelty, and murder in the second degree, we do not foreclose the possibility
that, in exceptional and rare circumstances of duress, justice may warrant reduction of a
defendant's guilt ...." Id.; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 278, § 33E (2010) (outlining SJC's
plenary authority to review capital cases).
47 See Vasquez, 971 N.E.2d at 792 ("Where escape was available to Davenport, duress does
not lie, even if it were a recognized defense in the Commonwealth."). In a standard application of
the elements of duress, the SJC determined that Davenport acted of his own volition, did not
possess a reasonable fear of immediate harm or death, and had ample opportunity to remove
himself from the situation. Id.
48 See id.
(explaining reasoning for permitting duress as mitigating factor upon review). The
SJC noted that in some cases "justice may warrant" the consideration of duress in murder trials.
Id.

49 See Mulroy, supra note 27, at 175 (discussing consequences of absolute bar on duress
defense). Mulroy argues that forbidding the availability of duress as a defense to all crimes is
based on an "overly harsh" and unrealistic assessment of human nature, as factors of duress must
in some cases excuse criminal behavior. Id.Even LaFave, considered the preeminent scholar on
the issue of coercion in the criminal context, recently updated his ubiquitous treatise to define
duress as an excuse rather than a justification, as well as to exclude any mention of a choice-ofevils rationale behind barring the defense in murder trials. See WAYNE R. LAFAvE,
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 9.7(a), at 73-74 (3d ed. 2003) (eschewing choice-of-evils
rationale in barring duress defense for murder). LaFave's treatise now reads that duress may
excuse an actor if he "lacked a fair opportunity to avoid acting unlawfully," a decidedly more
normative approach to the defense. Id.; see also Mulroy, supra note 27, at 171 (highlighting
LaFave's recent deviation from common-law explanation for barring duress as murder defense).
50 See United States v. LaFleur, 971 F.2d 200, 205 (9th Cir. 1991) (discussing choice-of-evils
rationale for duress defense); see also United States v. Mitchell, 725 F.2d 832, 835 n.4 (2d Cir.
1983) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIS *30) (describing common-law
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must be respected, the SJC's application of this antiquated norm is not in
keeping with modem criminal justice trends or the practical role of the
common law to reflect an ever-evolving mosaic of societal values and
expectations of behavior.5 ' Certain principles are surely indelible, and this
does not mean that modem society is or should be more willing to acquit
individuals charged with murder; however, whenever possible, society
should have the opportunity to consider doing so based on the sum of the
facts intotal.52 The role of the courts should not be to force unforgiving
moral standards upon those charged with a crime, even if that crime is
murder.53 The outright exclusion of the duress defense in murder trials
imposes upon the defendant an inflexible and imperfect standard of how a
human being should act at all times, and not an objective and independent
standard of how a reasonable person would act in a given situation. 5 4 Itis

exclusion of duress as murder defense); supra note 27 and accompanying text (explicating
traditional reasoning underlying choice of evils). The SJC's reluctance to do away with
established convention is understandable because there is evidence that the nearly "unbroken
tradition" of support for the choice-of-evils rationale stretches back to ancient times. See
Dressler, supra note 28, at 1370 (noting historical adherence to choice-of-evils rationale).
51 See generally People v. Anderson, 50 P.3d 368, 384-85 (Cal. 2002) (Kennard, J.,
concurring and dissenting in part) ("[T]he weight of scholarly commentary favors the ...
abolition of the common law murder exception to the duress defense."); Mulroy, supra note 27, at
207 (discussing recent approach to increased availability for duress as defense to murder). Even
in England, the source of the common-law bar on duress as a defense to homicide, more flexible
approaches to the proposition are being considered. See Reed, supra note 30, at 53-54 (noting
recent judicial and legislative disputes concerning duress as murder defense in England).
52 See Mulroy, supra note 27, at 175-76 (addressing moral concerns in permitting duress as
defense to murder). Allowing a jury to consider a defense of duress in homicide trials would not
necessarily lead to a murder defendant's escape from justice because juries will still require
evidence of a genuine state of duress and lesser charges and penalties would still be available to
punish an individual for his crimes. Id.Dressler argues that "reasonable minds can and will
differ regarding [the] proper boundaries" of the duress defense, and therefore the question of its
applicability should be left to a jury. Dressler, supra note 28, at 1368; see also Anderson, 50 P.3d
at 385 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (quoting Dressler's proposed standard of
reasonableness).
53 See Mulroy, supra note 27, at 176 (decrying overreach of courts in applying strict moral
standards). The choice-of-evils rationale "not only 'asks us to be virtuous,' but actually 'demands
our virtual sainthood."' Id.(quoting Dressler, supra note 28, at 1373). Such a narrow and
exacting paradigm cannot possibly apply equally to all crimes committed under duress, especially
when the situation is not as simple as taking a life to save one's own. Dressler, supra note 28, at
1352-53 (observing difficulty of applying choice of evils to lesser or similar crimes). A pre-trial
judicial balancing of the relative severity of a criminal act, or an avoided criminal act, takes a
critical question of fact away from the jury. Id.at 1345; see also Reed, supra note 30, at 69-70
(asserting capability of jury to assess facts regarding duress excuse).
54 See Dressler, supra note 28, at 1366 ("At its core, the defense of duress requires us to
determine what conduct we, a society of individual members of the human race, may legitimately
expect of our fellow threatened humans."). The jury is better situated than the court to evaluate,
based on specific facts and context, the reasonableness of an individual's actions through both a
moral and normative lens. See Reed, supra note 30, at 63 (observing suitability of jury to
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the province of the jury, not the court, to apply such a standard.5 5 In
affirming the choice-of-evils rationale, the SJC precluded this possibility in
favor of an approach that could potentially lead to injustice, albeit on rare
occasions.5 6 Regardless of the scarcity of true murder-under-duress cases,
justice would be better served in the Commonwealth if the adjudication of
such claims consisted of a primarily normative, not moral, approach.57

determine reasonable and moral behavior).
55 See Dressier, supra note 28, at 1373-74 (discussing benefits of normative jury analysis of
duress defense); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (1962) (leaving question of whether
duress is a valid murder defense to jury); Reed, supra note 30, at 69-71 (supporting jury
consideration of duress factors). Permitting juries to consider duress as a defense to murder
represents a more honest approach to our expectations of human behavior and would likely lead
to a more pragmatic and flexible criminal justice system. See Dressler, supra note 28, at 1368
("In the realm of duress, hypocrisy is the result of holding others to a standard of moral strength
to which we would not hold ourselves if we were similarly situated."); see also Mulroy, supra
note 27, at 175 (advocating normative approach to duress claims). Mulroy's inquisitive
inferential chain best explains the logic behind allowing the defense of duress in murder trials:
While it may be true in many situations that a person threatened with death
ought to have the fortitude to resist killing an innocent third party, can it
really be that there are never any situations in which the defendant's
eventual submission to the threats is understandable enough to allow an
excuse under the law? Put another way: Isn't the level of punishment
deserved by a defendant in this situation dependent upon the facts? If so,
then ought not such a fact-sensitive question be committed to the sound
discretion of a jury?
Id. The driving force behind allowing duress as an affirmative defense to murder is the concern
that a complete bar on the defense in homicide trials serves as a one-size-fits-all answer to a
distinctly complex and final question. Id.; see also Anderson, 50 P.3d at 387 (Kennard, J.,
concurring and dissenting in part) (noting complicated nature of debate over duress as valid
murder defense).
56 See Mulroy, supra note 27, at 175 (discussing limited authority where duress excused
murder); see also Brooks, supra note 32, at 868-69 (same). While they do exist, cases in which
factors of duress have excused intentional murder are not common and are rarely prosecuted. See
Mulroy, supra note 27, at 175 (noting scarcity of authority where duress excused murder).
Principled proponents of keeping the defense of duress from the jury's purview in murder trials
claim that the inherent evil of intentional murder should never be excused; however, the same
cannot be said about felony or accomplice murder, where the defendant may never have formed
the intent to kill. See Tully v. State, 730 P.2d 1206, 1210 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986) (reasoning
duress can excuse felony murder).
57 See Brooks, supra note 32, at 879 (stressing importance of reasonableness in duress
determination); Dressler, supra note 28, at 1385 (arguing reasonableness of duress should be
determined by jury); Reed, supra note 30, at 63 (advocating MPC designation of jury to
determine reasonableness). Although reasonableness should be the primary standard when
weighing a defense of duress in a murder trial, morality need not be wholly absent from a jury's
consideration. See Dressler, supra note 28, at 1334 ("[The defendant] should be excused only if
he attained or reflected society's legitimate expectations of moral strength."). However, any
moral consideration given to an individual's criminal act should be dependent upon objective
societal expectations of behavior under a particular set of circumstances. See Reed, supra note
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The SJC, like the Anderson court, focused too heavily on
unfounded policy concerns that allowing duress as an affirmative defense
to murder would encourage killing and increase gang violence.58
Permitting duress as a defense to murder would not increase gang violence,
just as barring the defense does not decrease it.5 9 It is highly unlikely that
potential legal defenses serve as a determining factor in the mind of a gang
member charged with an order to kill. 60 Practically, barring the duress
defense in gang-related murder cases is redundant-in Massachusetts, a
gang member or "nonmember associate" like Davenport would likely not
be permitted to claim duress anyway, as courts and legislatures have
routinely held that an individual's association with a criminal gang
qualifies as reckless behavior, rendering the defense unavailable. 6' The
availability of duress as a valid affirmative defense to murder would also
be unlikely to motivate potential killers with the confidence to kill, as juries
are extremely reluctant to acquit defendants charged with murder based on
claims of duress.62 If the defense were accessible to murder defendants in

30, at 55 ("[T]he standard is that of the reasonable man, not the reasonable hero. To suggest
otherwise is absurd.").
58 See Commonwealthv. Vasquez, 971 N.E.2d 783, 790-91 (Mass. 2012) (citing California's
struggles with gang violence in reasoning); see also Anderson, 50 P.3d at 374 (barring duress as
murder defense based on potential to increase gang violence); Dressler, supra note 28, at 1382
(detailing logical flaws in argument that permitting duress defense increases gang violence);
Mulroy, supra note 27, at 187 (contending that allowance of duress defense for murder would not
lead to killers evading responsibility).
59 See Mulroy, supra note 27, at 175 (discussing implausibility of duress defense's
unavailability deterring killing). No evidence exists to suggest that extending the availability of
the duress defense to murder defendants results in higher rates of killing. Id.
60 See id. (discussing motivation of individual ordered to kill). Mulroy states that
it is
reasonable to assume that the "last thing" on the mind of a potential killer under duress is
speculation concerning his subsequent prosecution. Id.
61 See United States v. Agard, 605 F.2d 665, 667 (2d Cir. 1979) (withholding duress defense
from reckless actor); Anderson, 50 P.3d at 386 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting in part)
("Because persons who join criminal street gangs ... can anticipate pressure to commit crimes,
the defense would usually be unavailable to those individuals."); State v. Scott, 827 P.2d 733,
739-40 (Kan. 1992) (holding voluntary membership in criminal gang precludes duress defense);
Commonwealth v. Allen, 717 N.E.2d 657, 660 (Mass. 1999) (same); Commonwealth v.
Robinson, 415 N.E.2d 805, 812 nil (Mass. 1981) (same); see also MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.09(2) (1962) (same); Mulroy, supra note 27, at 176 (describing lack of reckless behavior as
prerequisite for claiming duress defense). Although in Vasquez the SJC did not acknowledge this
specific redundancy, it did note that regardless of the availability of the duress defense to murder
defendants, Davenport's opportunity to escape prevented his use of the defense in Massachusetts.
Vasquez, 971 N.E.2d at 792 (concluding duress did not apply to actor with chance to escape).
62 See Mulroy, supra note 27, at 176 (discussing skepticism juries hold concerning duress
claims). As proof that moral consideration of a murder defendant's behavior is not lost under a
normative approach to duress, the desire to punish an actor for a heinous crime remains strong,
even if a duress defense is proffered. See Dressler, supra note 28, at 1373-74 (noting moral
considerations of jurors when faced with duress defense to murder); Reed, supra note 30, at 63
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Massachusetts, the average jury would acquit no more hardened killers than
the average judge, and would be able to reasonably consider the rare but
real murder-under-duress case when justice requires. 63 The harm in
allowing a murder defendant to present evidence of duress to a jury is
therefore difficult to envision. 64
The SJC did manage to find middle ground between common-law
doctrine and modem legal trends by permitting the consideration of duress
as a mitigating factor on review of intentional murder convictions. 65 This
position certainly alleviates some of the rigidity of the common-law rule,
yet forces a murder defendant with a potentially valid excuse of duress to
wait until after trial and conviction to plead his case in full. 66 At this point,
even if the SJC detects sufficient evidence of coercion present to justify the
excusal of the defendant's criminal conduct, nothing can be done 6
However, the allowance of duress consideration upon review, coupled with
the fact that the SJC's decision in Vasquez only bars the defense of duress
for intentional murder and not for lesser charges such as manslaughter,
marks a step in the right direction toward a more reasonable and

("[T]here is no doubt that juries are commendably robust in rejecting the [duress] defense where
appropriate.").
63 See Mulroy, supra note 27, at 175 (observing scarcity of true murder-under-duress cases);
supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing unlikelihood that juries would be prone to
acquit murder defendants). As for Davenport, it is highly unlikely that a Massachusetts jury
would consider the facts of his case to be a true murder-under-duress scenario; in fact, a jury
would no doubt reach the same conclusion as the SJC concerning the applicability of the duress
defense. Vasquez, 971 N.E.2d at 792 (concluding defendant did not kill under duress).
64 See Dressler, supra note 28, at 1373-74 (endorsing normative jury analysis of duress
defense); Reed, supra note 30, at 69-70 (same). Fears of mass acquittals if duress is made
available to murder defendants are groundless and likely stem from a lack of faith in the
competence of the average juror. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (noting rational
skepticism of modern juror). As juries are predisposed to disbelieve claims of duress in homicide
trials, the defense should not be barred from using the defense based on the flawed assumption
that actual and excusable murder-under-duress cases never occur. See Dressler, supra note 28, at
1373 ("It is not inherently imp[l]ausible to contend that persons of reasonable moral strength will
accede to some, but not all, homicides.").
65 See Vasquez, 971 N.E.2d at 792 (permitting duress in guilt reduction); see also Mulroy,
supra note 27, at 182 (describing increased parity in allowing duress for mitigation purposes).
66 See Brooks, supra note 32, at 885-86 (using example to display potential harm caused by
permitting duress only for mitigation). Brooks, using the example of an unwilling yet ultimately
obedient officer at the Srebrenica massacre, paints a vivid portrait of how permitting duress
simply for guilt reduction may not always achieve true justice. Id. An individual involved in, but
not guilty of, intentional murder based on coercion hardly escapes without consequence or
punishment: lesser charges, the actual and personal cost of being on trial, and the perpetual
associated stigma serve to punish the actor for his involvement. Id. at 868.
67 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 278, § 33E (2010) (authorizing SJC review of capital cases);
Vasquez, 971 N.E.2d at 792 (granting SJC authority to apply duress for mitigation purposes only).
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representative criminal justice system. 68 The SJC's departure from the
common-law rule, however slight, reveals a pragmatic and increasingly
common judicial recognition that specific factors of duress may be
essential to fair and complete adjudication, even where the affirmative
defense of duress is barred.6 9
In Commonwealth v. Vasquez, the SIC tasked itself with
determining what role, if any, duress should play in Massachusetts murder
trials. By invoking the choice-of-evils rationale to keep the affirmative
defense of duress from those charged with murder, the SIC validated a
seemingly righteous yet inherently unfair principle of common law. While
duress consideration in guilt reduction better serves the murder defendant
than an absolute bar, the SJC's reluctance to allow duress as a defense to all
crimes reflects a widespread, instinctive adherence to a deeply-engrained
tenet of Anglo-American common law-one based on a simplistic
appraisal of human nature and the purpose of the criminal justice system.
Whether the specific circumstances of an individual's actions warrant the
excusal of those actions is primarily a question of reasonableness, not
morality. This question should not be disregarded by an indiscriminate
legislative or judicial standard; it should be addressed and answered by a
jury.
George K. Bullen

68

See Vasquez, 971 N.E.2d at 792 (barring duress defense only for first- and second-degree

murder); Mulroy, supra note 27, at 182 (observing parity behind allowing duress for guilt
reduction). It is difficult to see how justice is not served when a criminal defendant is allowed to
present-and a jury is allowed to consider all of the facts relevant to the defendant's side of the
story. See Mulroy, supra note 27, at 162 n.16 (discussing unjust result of Tennessee case where

duress bar precluded murder defendant's complete defense).
69 See Vasquez, 971 N.E.2d at 792 (granting SJC authority to consider duress in guilt
reduction); Mulroy, supra note 27, at 173, 207 (noting modem trend of accepting duress as
murder defense and as mitigating factor). Such recognition "reminds us that countless ordinary
people, like ourselves, have weaknesses and susceptibilities that allow us to contribute to the
world's injustices and cruelty. That we are human really means, at times, that we are all too
human." Dressler, supra note 28, at 1386.

